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I.

INTRODUCTION

The current United States (―U.S.‖) administration faces an unresolved legal problem in the so-called war on terrorism. The problem is
what to do with Guantanamo detainees: whether to try some of them in
federal courts; create a national security court to deal with cases involving the sensitive intelligence information; or release others. 1 Meanwhile,
some of the key architects of the September 11 attacks, including Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed, are scheduled to appear before a civilian court in
New York. 2 This move of the Obama administration has been lauded by


Senior Research Associate, Institute of State and Law, Georgian Academy of
Sciences. This contribution is based on a presentation given at the symposium "Comparative Constitutional Law: National Security Across the Globe," which took place at Pace
Law School on November 13, 2009. The presentation form is essentially maintained. The
author would like to thank Dr. Helmut Aust for his comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. Any errors are mine.
1
Kelli Arena, Obama Team Ponders What to Do with Guantanamo Inmates, CNN
NEWS,
Nov.
10,
2008,
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/10/obama.transition.guantanamo/index.html.
2
Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind before Civilian Court in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at 1.
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many observers 3 while criticized by others.4 While the initial plan to try
alleged terrorists in ordinary criminal courts is still under review at the
time of writing,5 the future prospects of a fair civilian trial remain uncertain at best for hundreds of detained terror suspects.
What is a proper venue for trying terrorism detainees? Policymakers and academia alike have been discussing the creation of a distinct
system of special courts as adjudicatory instances6 or courts supervising
a new preventive detention system. 7 Legal scholars have considered extending the military detention paradigm to new special courts or creating
a hybrid system of national security courts, which would combine elements of ordinary criminal justice applicable within a ―peacetime‖ legal
order with attributes of military justice as applied in wartime. 8
One justification for the establishment of specialized courts trying
alleged terrorists is the failure of the criminal justice system to deal with

Editorial, A Return to American Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, at 22; Editorial, Terrorism on Trial; There are Good Reasons to Try Khalid Sheik Mohammed in New York,
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2009, at A20; Chris Smith, Trying Question: Why Putting Khalid
Sheik Mohamed on Trial Downtown is the Right Thing for the U.S. – and the City. (And if
Rudy Were Still U.S. Prosecutor, He’d Agree.), Nov. 20, 2009, N.Y. MAG., available at
http://nymag.com/news/politics/citypolitic/62255/.
4
Editorial, KSM Hits Manhattan – Again: Eric Holder’s Decision to Move a Trial
on War Crimes to American Soil is Morally Confused, Dangerous and Political a Fault,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2009, at 14; Giuliani Criticizes Terror Trials in New York, N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
15,
2009,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/us/politics/16giuliani.html; Bloomberg: Try 9/11
Mastermind Somewhere Else, N.Y. POST, Jan. 28, 2010, available at
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/mike_try_1w1hLYpkm0FihEHooEqUd
N; Peter Beaumont, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Trial Poses Huge Challenges for US Judiciary, GUARDIAN, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.guard-ian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/13/911mastermind-trial-challenges-analysis.
5
US to Decide on Where to Try Alleged 9/11 Plotters “In Weeks”, Holder Says,
N.Y. POST, Apr. 8, 2010.
6
GLENN SULMASY, NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM – A NATURAL EVOLUTION
OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2009).
7
Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007,
at 19; see also BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN
THE AGE OF TERROR (2008). For possible obstacles for a transition to national security
courts, see Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantánamo, Obstacles and Options, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 29 (2008),
8
Amos N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for the Detention of Terrorists, 19 FLA. J. INT’ L L. 511-30 (2007) [hereinafter Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan]. For security-based detention in armed conflict see Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and
Other Situations of Violence, 85 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 375-91 (2005).
3
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terrorism suspects. The exigencies of an emergency situation, which
may be triggered by terrorist attacks, can indeed create difficulties for
ordinary courts in dealing with terrorism, but such is highly circumstance-dependent. Further, any general assumption that criminal courts
are unable to deal with terrorism offences presupposes that the alleged
terrorists, as a matter of principle, do not qualify as ordinary criminals.
This presupposition is tied to two fundamental issues: who are the terrorists; and what is the distinction to be made between criminals and terrorists? The proponents of special terrorism courts do not seem to have
compelling answers to these questions and are often focused on the
strand of issues relating to the procedural difficulties of the criminal justice system in terrorism trials. According to this view, ordinary civilian
courts are not a proper venue for prosecuting terrorism suspects because
of their incapability to deal with sensitive information9 and because of
the need to protect witnesses. From this perspective, it could be argued
that another (―hybrid‖10) legal paradigm is needed. 11 However, these arguments are not persuasive; their proponents have not shown so far that
the criminal justice definitely failed12 or that the same goal of providing
procedural ―comfort‖ in terrorism trials cannot be achieved through adjustments to existing criminal justice systems.
I would like to offer the reader a European perspective on this issue.
Accordingly, my paper will address the question as to whether and to

9
On the secrecy issue see Serrin Turner & Stephen J. Schulhofer, THE SECRECY
PROBLEM IN TERRORISM TRIALS, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCHOOL OF
LAW, available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/2941d4bea-7c3c450d2_4sm6iy66c.pdf.
10
Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 8.
11
See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts
after Guantanamo, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2008) [hereinafter Guiora, Military Commissions]. ―Precisely because the individuals I refer as ―post 9/11 detainees‖ are neither
criminals under the traditional criminal law paradigm nor prisoners of war according to
international law, we must establish a legal definition of ―detainee‖ so that we may determine the rights and privileges to accord them.‖
12
Contra Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE :
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: 2009 UPDATE AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENT,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
FIRST,
July
2009,
available
at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuit-justice-09-update.pdf;
THE
CASE AGAINST A SPECIAL TERRORISM COURT : POLICY PAPER, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
March 2009, available at http://www.humanrights-first.org/pdf/090323-LS-nsc-policypaper.pdf. See also Andrew Cohen, A Terrorism Trial’s Myths, WASH. POST, Nov. 14,
2009, at A15.
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what extent the creation and operation of a distinct system of security
courts supervising preventive detention of terror suspects would be compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (―ECHR‖). The
procedural and institutional guarantees for independent and impartial justice systems created by the ECHR may impose considerable legal constraints on creating a distinct system of security courts in Europe. Moreover, problems may also arise with regard to certain procedural aspects
of the operation of such courts when seen in the light of the ECHR. In
addition, the ECHR does not fully recognize one of the rationales for the
creation and operation of a system of special terrorism courts, namely
preventive detention for security purposes. Although such detention is
not forbidden by the ECHR in absolute terms and can be permissible in
emergency situations, nevertheless the general requirement of overall
fairness in proceedings under the ECHR, even in times of emergency,
limits the application of preventive security-based detention.
I argue in this paper that terrorist suspects should not be seen as
non-prosecutable detainees because such a view undercuts general procedural fairness and compromises individual liberty. The ECHR allows
Contracting States to keep their flexibility in their fight against terrorism
through the means of the traditional criminal justice. Therefore, the reasonableness of the creation of a special court system dealing with terrorism cases and the application of relaxed procedures in terrorism trials
should be considered carefully not only in peacetime, but also in emergencies.
II.

GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Article 5(1) of the ECHR determines that ―[e]veryone has the right
to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law . . . .‖ There are six grounds for detention in Article
5(1),13 and preventive security detention is not among them. 14 Under the

The European Convention of Human Rights art. 5 (Nov. 4, 1950), available at
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#C.Art5 (last visited Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter
ECHR]. Article 5(1) allows a deprivation of liberty to be justified in the following cases:
―a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed
by law;
13
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ECHR, detention is only permissible after conviction by a competent
court or while awaiting trial.15 Although Article 5(1)(c) authorizes detention ―when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent committing an offence,‖ this provision is only applicable in detention for criminal law purposes. Terrorism suspects may also be detained under the
same Article 5(1)(c) on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offense.16 The ECHR, however, does not permit detention for general
crime prevention or gathering information; there must always be a link to
criminal proceedings.17 Even the very serious public concerns regarding
terrorism would not justify an indefinite deprivation of liberty without
prospect of a fair trial. In A. and Others v. United Kingdom,18 the Court
reaffirmed that ―paragraphs (a) to (f) amount to an exhaustive list of exceptions and that only a narrow interpretation of these exceptions is
compatible with the aims of Article 5 [of the ECHR].‖19 Thus, a purely
security-based detention of terrorism suspects would not be permissible

c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
d. the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority;
e. the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; [and]
f. the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken
with a view to deportation or extradition.‖
14
For an overview, see Helena Cook, Preventive Detention – International Standards and the Protection of the Individual, in PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 1-52 (Stansilaw Frankowski & Dinah Shelton
eds., 1992); Despina Chatzivassiliou, The Guarantees of Judicial Control with Respect to
Deprivation of Liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights: An
Overview of the Strasbourg Case-Law, 5 ERA-FORUM 4, 499-519 (Dec. 2004),
http://www.spr-ingerlink.com/content/y5pl46u146223q70/fulltext.pdf.
15
Supra note 13.
16
Id. lit. c.
17
See Ciulla v. Italy, 148 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 38 (1989); see also Brogan &
Others v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 53 (1988).
18
A. & Others v. United Kingdom, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R.
19
Id. ¶ 171. See Sangeeta Shah, From Westminster to Strasbourg: A. and Others v.
United Kingdom, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 473 (2009).
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under the Convention’s ―peacetime‖ legal regime.
Is preventive detention lawful in times of emergency? According to
Article 15 (1)20:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its
other obligations under international law.

First, it must be emphasized that recourse to the emergency derogation provision in Article 15 is seldom made. Although the terrorism
threat may amount to a public emergency under the Convention, 21 there
is no need to rely on an emergency legal regime in the majority of cases
involving terrorist threats. Contracting States possess enough flexibility
under the ECHR to adjust their criminal law to the contemporary challenges of terrorism through, for example, extending pre-charge detention
powers. The European Court of Human Rights (―ECtHR‖), however,
sets limits to such adjustments based on Articles 5 and 6, which indicate
that pre-trial detention of terrorism suspects must not exceed certain limits, namely the appropriate time limit for pre-charge detention,22 and the
principle of overall fairness in proceedings must be upheld.
A government’s valid derogation under Article 15 may preclude the
unlawfulness of a preventive detention, which is tied to the primary issue
of what circumstances justify the proclamation of a public emergency.
The existence of a public emergency falls under the ECtHR’s margin of
appreciation doctrine, which indicates that states have considerable lee-

See DAVID J. HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE & COLIN WARBRICK, LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 617 (2d ed. 2009).
21
In A. & Others v. United Kingdom, the Court agreed with the House of Lords that
there was ―an emergency threatening the life of the nation‖ for the purposes of Article 15.
A. & Others, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 181. While doing so, the Court interpreted the criteria
already elaborated in the Greek Case for an emergency threatening the life of the nation
and arrived at the conclusion that the margin of appreciation of state authorities shall not
be significantly restricted and terrorism may well constitute a threat to the life of the nation within the meaning of Article 15. See id. ¶¶ 173, 176, 179-181.
22
The Court ruled in the Brogan & Others judgment that, unless there is a valid
derogation under Article 15 ECHR, any excess of four days of police custody, even in the
most exceptional circumstances, including the fights against terrorism, constitutes a violation of Article 5(3). See Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom, 1988 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶
62.
20
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way as to the preconditions of the situation, 23 but any derogation from
individual liberty must be strictly required by the exigencies of the emergency. 24 Although the ECtHR has been criticized for its deferential approach to the admissibility of emergency derogations from Convention
rights, the Strasbourg Court has not been leaving Contracting States an
unlimited discretion with regard to measures that are acceptable in cases
of terrorist threats.25 A relatively recent confirmation of the ECtHR’s deferential approach is that the Court (once again) lowered the threshold
for the proclamation of a public emergency in A. and Others v United
Kingdom when it disagreed with Lord Hoffman in the Belmarsh case. 26
Lord Hoffman argued that a terrorism threat does not necessarily put the
life of the nation into question and therefore, it does not deserve to be
seen as an emergency within the meaning of Article 15 of the ECHR. 27
Contrary to this view, the Court, however, emphasized that ―[t]he requirement of imminence [of future terrorist attacks] cannot be interpreted
so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it.‖28 This means that the Contracting States
are allowed to take comprehensive measures with a view to preventing
future terrorist threats from materializing. In any case, the Court continues to require that the nature of the particular threat be demonstrated and
the proportionality of the response be established.
See Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 207 (1978); Brannigan & McBride
v. United Kingdom, 258-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 43 (1993).
24
See Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 207; see also Aksoy, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 68.
25
In Klass & Others v. Germany, the Court stated that ―[i]t is certainly not for the
Court to substitute for the assessment of the national authorities any other assessment of
what might be the best policy in this field. Nevertheless, the Court stresses that this does
not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an unlimited discretion . . . . The Court, being
aware of the danger such a law poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on
the ground of defending it, affirms that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the
struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.‖ 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 49 (1979) (internal citation omitted); see also Brannigan
& McBride, 258-B Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 43.
26
See A. & Others, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 177.
27
See A. & Others v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, ¶ 97 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). In 2004 the House of Lords ruled that § 23 of the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 was not compatible with the ECHR because
denying people their liberty indefinitely was disproportionate to the existing threat and
limiting indefinite detention to non-British people was racially discriminatory. See id. ¶¶
68, 90, 95.
28
A. & Others, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 177.
23
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The ECtHR has dealt with the issue of detention for security purposes on several occasions and has determined preconditions for such detentions. In Lawless v. Ireland, the Court concluded that the administrative detention of individuals suspected of intending to take part in
terrorist activities appeared to be a measure required by the circumstances of the emergency, which was proclaimed by the Irish Government
in July 1957. The Court concluded that the ―military, secret and terrorist
character‖ of the IRA, ―the fear they created among the population,‖ and
―the fact that these groups operated mainly in Northern Ireland, [with]
their activities in the Republic of Ireland being virtually limited to the
preparation of armed raids across the border,‖ caused ―great difficulties‖
in ―amassing . . . the evidence [required] to convict persons involved in
activities of the IRA and its splinter groups.‖ 29 At the same time, the
Court found that other less restrictive means could not achieve the same
goal of preventing terrorist acts.30 In addition, the Court noted that the
Offences against the State (Amendment) Act of 1940, which instituted
administrative detention for counter-terrorism purposes, provided safeguards designed to prevent abuses in the operation of the administrative
detention system. 31 Such safeguards included a constant supervision by
Parliament, the establishment of a Detention Commission including an
officer of the Defence Forces and two judges, and the power of ordinary
courts to ―compel the Detention Commission to carry out its functions.‖ 32
In Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom,33 the Court upheld British
detentions of terrorists in Northern Ireland for periods of up to seven
days without judicial control.34 The Court emphasized the availability of
safeguards, especially the detainee’s access to habeas corpus.35 In Aksoy
v. Turkey, however, the Court found that a detention of fourteen days
without judicial supervision was ―exceptionally long, and left the appli-

29

Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 1961 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 36.
Sealing the border would have imposed ―extremely serious repercussions on the
population as a whole.‖ Id.
31
In this context, it has been emphasized that a ―detention commission‖ had been set
up, which could hear complaints from detainees and, if necessary, release them. Moreover, the ordinary courts supervised over the Detention Commission. See id. ¶ 37.
32
Id.
33
Brannigan & McBride, 258-B Eur. Ct. H.R.
34
See Susan Marks, Civil Liberties at the Margin: the UK Derogation and the European Court of Human Rights, 15 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 69 (1995).
35
Brannigan & McBride, 258-B Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 26-28.
30
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cant vulnerable not only to arbitrary interference with his right to liberty
but also to torture.‖36 In addition, the Court emphasized that ―the Government have [sic] not adduced any detailed reasons . . . as to why the
fight against terrorism in South-East Turkey rendered judicial intervention impracticable.‖37 Moreover, the Court considered that ―in this case
insufficient safeguards were available to the applicant . . . . In particular,
the denial of access to a lawyer, doctor, relative or friend and the absence
of any realistic possibility of being brought before a court to test the legality of the detention meant that he was left completely at the mercy of
those holding him.‖38 Thus, any restrictive measure taken must constitute
a genuine response to the emergency situation, which may imply the inability of the ordinary criminal justice system to deal with terrorism under
the given circumstances. In any case, it must be determined whether safeguards have been put in place to protect individuals against abuses of
emergency powers.
III.

PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES IN ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE ECHR

Once preventive detention is considered to be a measure strictly required by the exigencies of the case, the institutional and procedural underpinnings required to protect the individual’s right to a fair trial to the
greatest extent possible should be put in place. There must be an opportunity for terrorism suspects to challenge their detention in court pursuant
to Article 5(4) of the ECHR: ―[e]veryone who is deprived of his liberty
by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his
release ordered if the detention is not lawful.‖39
1.

Judicial Independence as a Requirement for Procedural Fairness
The use of preventive detention as a counter-terrorist measure or ad-

Aksoy, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 78.
Id. In Demir & Others v. Turkey, the Court regarded sixteen to twenty-three days
incommunicado detention without judicial supervision as not justified under derogation
from Article 5. 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 56-58. Similarly, in Nuray Sen v. Turkey eleven
days detention without judicial supervision was seen as not justified under derogation
from Article 5, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 22-29.
38
Aksoy, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 83.
39
ECHR, supra note 13, art. 5(4).
36
37
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justments to criminal justice systems in Europe have seldom resulted in
the creation of a distinct system of terrorism courts. 40 When a state decides to establish a special terrorism tribunal supervising preventive security detentions, what form should the court take? The ECtHR does not
specify the type of court in which a detainee can contest the lawfulness
of his/her detention. The special tribunal does not have to be a court constituting part of the judicial system. The term refers to bodies which exhibit not only common fundamental features, of which most important is
independence of the executive and the parties to the case, but also the
guarantees of a judicial procedure appropriate to the kind of deprivation
of liberty in question. 41
The ECtHR must ascertain whether the manner in which courts
function can infringe on the detainee’s right to the overall fairness of
proceedings. Specialized courts may be susceptible to executive influence in a way that ordinary judges are not. Such concerns may be raised
especially with regard to the participation of military personnel in special
courts. When dealing with the operation of the State Security Courts in
Turkey, which until 1999 included military officers, the ECtHR emphasized that the defendant was justified in fearing that the court would allow itself to be unduly influenced by considerations unrelated to the nature of the case.42

40
France created a magistrate system dealing with terrorism, as part of its 1986
counterterrorist legislation. Judges acquired the competence to order preventive detention
for up to six days. The Diplock courts in the U. K. that tried members of the IRA were
instituted by the Northern Ireland emergency legislation. These courts have been criticized as arbitrary. They were abolished in 2007 following the success of the peace process. State Security Courts in Turkey based on 1982 Constitution dealt with crimes against
the state security including terrorism. The military involvement in court proceedings has
been regarded by the ECtHR as a violation of the fair trial standards of Article 6 ECHR.
In 1999, the Government made the court civilian-run. The SSC were abolished in 2004
as part of Turkey’s efforts to join the EU. For an overview, see GLEN SULMASY, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM 158 (2009).
41
Hutchison Reid v. U.K, 2003 IV-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 64.
42
Altay, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 72-75. It should be noted in this context that some
European States have expressed reluctance to extradite persons to the U.S. if they are to
be tried before a military tribunal – the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany concerning the extradition of two Yemenites to the USA is worth mentioning.
The U.S. agreement that neither suspect would be detained at Guantanamo played a central role in the final outcome of proceedings. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[federal constitutional court] Nov. 5, 2003, 2 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE]
1243/03
(F.R.G.),
available
at
http://www.bundesverfass-
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A specialized court, consisting of civilian judges and based on appropriate institutional underpinnings, may satisfy the requirements of judicial independence and constitute a competent court within the meaning
of the ECHR. The most problematic issue in this context would be the
extent of limitations imposed on the guarantees of procedural fairness in
such courts in the name of public security, which may undermine the existing (properly functioning) system of ordinary criminal justice – under
certain circumstances and especially in times of stress, the government
may be induced to rely heavily upon special courts. In such situations the
extent to which an individual is protected within an ordinary criminal
justice system can be significantly modified in a special court.
2.

Setting Standards for the Extent and Quality of Evidence

One of the main concerns raised by the proponents of national security courts is a possible improper disclosure of information during terrorism trials that may compromise national security. Proponents argue that
burdens are imposed on criminal courts by certain evidentiary and procedural rules, and a specialized court would allow ―matters of national security [to be kept] confidential as well as to guarantee the defendants[’]
rights to a fair trial.‖43 A central question in this context is how intelligence is gathered, evaluated, and used in court proceedings. A State may
claim that it is necessary, in light of public interest, to interfere with individual rights by relying on information that cannot be fully revealed.
The entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence for criminal law purposes can be weighed against the State’s national security interests or the
interests of witnesses. 44 Nonetheless, certain criteria must be observed.
In A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR heard a claim under
Article 5(4), which provides for the right of every detainee to challenge
the legality of detention in immigration cases. The applicant argued that
the proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission

ungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20031105_2bvr124303.html?Suchbeg-riff=jemen
(in
German) (last visited Jan. 11, 2009). T. R. Reid, Europeans Reluctant to Send Terror
Suspects to U.S.; Allies Oppose Death Penalty and Bush’s Plan for Secret Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A23.
43
Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts after Guantanamo,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 199 (2008).
Doorson v. the Netherlands, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R., 70.

148 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 1:9 2010]
(SIAC)45 did not satisfy due process requirements because some of the
evidence in the proceedings was not disclosed to the applicants, and the
SIAC used special advocates with security clearances46 who could not
communicate with their clients during proceedings pursuant to the UK
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The ECtHR assessed each of the
complaints on a case-by-case basis. In doing so, the Court referred to the
SIAC as a ―fully independent court‖ 47 and did not put into question its
impartiality.
Standards, nevertheless, are necessary for evidence in terrorism cases where classified information may play a crucial role. 48 There are
questions as to whether such standards can be established, whether they
could fully comply with the ECHR’s guarantees to a fair trial, and to
what extent the standards should deviate from ordinary criminal proceedings. The ECtHR attempted in the A and Others v the UK to develop
certain criteria on the extent and quality of evidence needed to justify a
preventive detention in immigration cases. One of the problematic issues
related to the overall fairness of proceedings was the fact that neither the
applicants nor their legal advisers could see the classified material relevant to court proceedings. Instead, the classified material was disclosed
to one or more special advocates, appointed by the Solicitor General to
act on behalf of each applicant. From the point at which the special advocate first had access to the closed material, he/she was not permitted to
have any further contact with the applicant and his representatives, save
for with the permission of the SIAC. The ECtHR stated that where full
disclosure was not possible, Article 5(4) required that the difficulties this
caused were counterbalanced in such a way that each applicant still had
the possibility of effectively challenging the allegations against him be-

45

The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) was set up in response to
Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R., by the Special Immigration Appeals
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fore an independent judiciary.49
Further, the Court dealt with the extent to which the evidence is disclosed in the Court. According to the Court, ―[w]here the evidence was
to a large extent disclosed and the open material played the predominant
role in the determination, it could not be said that the applicant was denied an opportunity effectively to challenge the reasonableness of the
Secretary of State's belief and suspicions about him.‖ 50 In other cases,
even where all or most of the evidence remained undisclosed, if the allegations contained in the open material were sufficiently specific, it should
have been possible for the applicant to provide his representatives and
the special advocate with information with which to refute the allegations
without his having to know the detail or sources of the evidence which
formed the basis of the allegations.51 The Court here recognized the
wide discretion of Contracting States’ authorities to not disclose evidence derived from classified information. Where, however, the open
material consisted purely of general assertions and the authority’s (here,
SIAC's) decision to maintain the detention was based solely, or to a decisive degree, on closed material, the procedural requirements of Article
5(4) would not be satisfied. 52 Thus, a judge has to take into account the
extent to which the relevant material is disclosed and the specificity of
the open information available to the detainees. However, this standard
can only be applied on a case-by-case basis.53
3.

Limiting the rights of defense?

The ECHR does not require that the proceedings against individuals
suspected of involvement in terrorism fully reflect all guarantees of a fair
trial, but it does require that the proceedings as a whole should be fair.
The ECtHR has decided in the abovementioned A and Others case that
Article 5(4) proceedings with regard to terrorism immigration cases must

A., 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 218.
Id. ¶ 220.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
The Court found that there was a violation of Article 5(4) in respect of four of the
applicants who were not able to effectively challenge their detention. The rights of five
other applicants have not been violated. Id. 212-24.
49
50
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be conducted in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness. 54
While doing so, the Court emphasized that ―[a]lthough it is not always
necessary that an Article 5 § 4 procedure be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6… it must have a judicial character and provide guarantees appropriate to the type of deprivation of liberty in question.‖55 Owing to the ―dramatic impact of the lengthy—and
what appeared at that time to be indefinite—deprivation of liberty,‖ the
ECtHR held that the full level of protections accorded by Article 6(1) to
criminal proceedings should have been guaranteed to the applicants. 56
This holding can be interpreted in such a way that criminal procedural
safeguards shall adhere to special court proceedings dealing with preventive security detentions under the ECHR, especially in cases of so-called
―indefinite detention‖ of suspected terrorists.
It has been argued that one of the effective ways to protect the interests and rights of alleged terrorists is to employ special advocates who
have security clearance to access all information related to a given proceeding. According to the ECtHR, ―[t]he special advocate could provide
an important, additional safeguard through questioning the State's witnesses on the need for secrecy and through making submissions to the
judge regarding the case for additional disclosure.‖57 Nevertheless, the
communication between the special advocates and the alleged terrorists
must also be in line with procedural fairness:
The Court further considers that the special advocate could perform an important role in counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure and the lack of a
full, open, adversarial hearing by testing the evidence and putting arguments on behalf of the detainee during the closed hearings. However, the
special advocate could not perform this function in any useful way unless
the detainee was provided with sufficient information about the allegations
against him to enable him to give effective instructions to the special advocate.58

Furthermore, the principle of the equality of arms cannot be fully
implemented when the judges and special advocates have access to
closed information, but the detainees and their legal representatives do

Id. ¶¶ 203, 217.
Id. ¶ 203.
56
Id. ¶ 217.
57
Id. ¶ 219.
58
Id. ¶ 220.
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not enjoy such a privilege. 59
The Court examined the lawfulness of the extent to which the rights
of defense may be limited in cases involving the threats of terrorism. 60
Any difficulties caused to the defense by a limitation on its rights must
be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities. 61 The ECtHR, however, does not decide whether a nondisclosure of evidence was strictly necessary since, as a general rule, it is
for the national courts to assess the evidence before them. 62 The
ECtHR’s task is to ascertain whether the decision-making procedure applied in each case complied, as far as possible, with the requirements of
adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate
safeguards to protect the accused’s rights. 63 Generally, the accused’s
rights must be upheld, and the manner in which the trial is conducted
must not undermine these rights.
Thus, it can be concluded that the far-reaching deviations from the
ordinary guarantees of a fair trial cannot be justified by the threat of terrorism; there must be compelling reasons that incapacitate the state to
fully guarantee all relevant safeguards of criminal justice. Taking into
account the European States’ overall reluctance to rely on emergency legal regime and the actual circumstances on the ground that do not create
a need for such reliance, the fight against terrorism in Europe will rather
remain within the bounds of the ordinary criminal justice, especially
when there are no real incentives to make a dangerous move into a different legal order where a preventive detention of suspected terrorists
constitutes a rule while their criminal trial is rather an exception.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC JUDICIARY: COMPROMISING
NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE NAME OF THE RULE OF LAW?
The recent practice of domestic civilian courts demonstrates that ordinary judiciary is not powerless in the face of terrorism threats. On the
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other hand, it illustrates the limits imposed by human rights that special
courts would face in similar situations. 64 These problems concern the detainee’s access to witnesses, standards of proof, admissibility of evidence, and the use of intelligence information. All these evidentiary
questions are related to the central issues of how to gather and utilize
sensitive information that may play a significant role in terrorism trials,
what the burden of proof should be in the admissibility of certain intelligence-gathering techniques, and with which party the burden of proof
lies.
Ordinary criminal courts have been struggling with procedural problems in terrorism trials where the intelligence information and sources
played a decisive role in upholding the standards of a fair trial. In 2004,
the German High Court reconsidered the conviction of Mounir alMotassadeq, who was held responsible for the events of September 11,
because of doubts about fairness of the proceedings against him. 65 A
central issue was the question of how a court should deal with a situation
where persons, who may possess important information pertaining to the
case in question, are not allowed to appear as witnesses. 66 The court
held that the right to a fair trial can be violated when executive authorities are withholding exculpatory evidence.
The disclosure of sensitive information can be decisive in criminal
proceedings. It is worth mentioning in this context that the testimony
given by the President of the German Secret Service during the Mzoudi
trial played a crucial role in the court’s decision to drop the terrorism
charges against Mzoudi. In particular, he reported secret service information that the September 11 attacks were not planned by the Muslim
students in Hamburg but by the leadership of the Al-Qaida terrorist network in Afghanistan.67
Security courts may face difficulties in determining the proper burden of proof in similar situations, leaning towards deciding them on the
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basis of mere suspicion refuted by the government’s evidence, the reliability and accuracy of which cannot be sufficiently proven.
The fight against terrorism through means which lie outside ordinary criminal justice may lead to detentions on a low burden of suspicion
68
and highly unreliable (secret) evidence. For example, part 4 of the UK
Terrorism Act of 2001 has been criticized as authorizing detention of
suspected international terrorists on executive order and on a low burden
of suspicion.69
The ECtHR is not in a position to examine the national authorities’
determination that someone poses a serious security threat to the state.
International law does not establish standards for identifying when a terrorism suspect poses a sufficiently serious security threat to render an individual’s (preventive) detention non-arbitrary, and the domestic legal
rules on the determination of dangerousness may also be vague. This
does not mean, however, that mere suspicion should become an effective
yardstick for security-based detentions. Generally, any suspicion which
70
constitutes a basis for detention shall be reasonable, and the detainee
shall have the right to contest it in a competent court. Having reasonable
suspicion presupposes the ―existence of facts or information which
would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have
71
committed an offense.‖ The ECtHR has slightly modified these standards for terrorism suspects. According to the Court, the Government
has to furnish ―at least some facts or information capable of satisfying
the Court that the arrested person was reasonably suspected of having
committed the alleged offence. This is all the more necessary where . . .
the domestic law does not require reasonable suspicion, but sets a lower
72
threshold by merely requiring honest suspicion.‖

See, e.g., Audrey Gillan, Judges Accuse Blankett Over Terror Suspect, GUARDIAN,
Mar. 9, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/mar/09/al-qaida.september11.
69
Colin Warbrick, The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human
Rights, 15 EUR J. INT’L. L. 989, 995, 1013 (2004). See also Opinion of the Commissioner
for Human Rights, Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, On Certain Aspects of the United Kingdom
Derogation From Article 5 Par. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Aug.
28,
2002,
CommDH(2002)7,
available
at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=980187&Site=COE.
70
ECHR, supra note 13, lit. c.
71
See Fox v. United Kingdom, 182 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶32; O’Hara v. United
Kingdom, 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34.
72
Fox, 182 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶32; O’Hara, 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 35.
68

154 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 1:9 2010]
International counter-terrorist cooperation may cause additional difficulties regarding access to relevant information in terrorism trials. The
disclosure may be most problematic when states are aware that the interrogation methods used against suspected terrorists cannot produce admissible evidence. For example, not all intelligence information for
which the practice of torture is certified is disclosed in a court. One may
argue that the disclosure of sensitive information stemming from international intelligence cooperation may damage not only the national security
of the respective (disclosing) state but also the international effort to
combat terrorism, and therefore such information should only be disclosed in a specialized security court.
A recent U.K. case related to the illegal treatment of Binyam Mohamed clearly demonstrated that there may be a conflict between the interests of inter-state counterterrorist intelligence cooperation and human
73
rights, and raised the question of what the proper balance should be. In
Mohamed,74 the U.K. court dismissed the Foreign Secretary’s claims that
disclosing the evidence would harm national security and threaten the
U.K.’s intelligence-sharing arrangements with the U.S.,75 and stated the
following:
In our view, as a court in the United Kingdom, a vital public interest requires, for reasons of democratic accountability and the rule of law in the
United Kingdom, that a summary of the most important evidence relating
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to the involvement of the British security services in wrongdoing be placed
76
in the public domain in the United Kingdom.

The Court further noted that ―the suppression of reports of wrongdoing by officials (in circumstances which cannot in any way affect national security) would be inimical to the rule of law.‖77 The U.K. Government’s efforts to enforce a non-disclosure obligation in an Appeals
Court failed. 78
A court in Milan, by recently convicting 23 US and Italian security
officials who had abducted Muslim cleric Abu Omar on suspicion of
terrorism from an open street in Milan, has shown that the barriers
erected by the domestic law concepts of state secrecy may cause difficulties to terrorism trials in civilian courts but do not always prevent them
79
The Italian Constitutional
from undertaking their judicial function.
Court, while determining competencies of the branches of government in
the area of state secrets, recognized the wide discretion of the executive
by ruling on March 11, 2009 that any evidence of coordination between
the Italian secret services and the C.I.A. violated state secrecy rules and
was therefore inadmissible. 80 At the same time, the Court indicated that
the Milan trial of U.S. intelligence officers involved in Omar’s abduction
may continue proceedings if all classified information is withdrawn and
only open sources of information are presented before the court.81 The
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Milan court indeed ruled that there was enough evidence to proceed with
the case (As a result, not all suspects have been charged. Charges were
dropped against five Italians because evidence against them violated
state secrecy rules and against three Americans because of diplomatic
immunity). 82
The domestic civilian courts may prevent the lowering of standards
regarding the conduct of intelligence gathering and the use of sensitive
information in terrorism trials while maintaining a proper balance between national security interests and fundamental rights. At the same
time, they cannot do away with state secrecy rules altogether. Notwithstanding the national authorities’ margin of appreciation in adjusting
their criminal justice systems to contemporary security challenges, the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR can play a guiding role and shed light on
some of the procedural difficulties with which the domestic judiciary
may be confronted in terrorism cases. This especially concerns the need
for an effective protection of important procedural rights even in times of
serious security threats.
V. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that criminal justice will be substituted by a new procedural paradigm of national security courts in Europe not least because
of the strict requirements of the legal regime of the European Convention
on Human Rights and also as a matter of legal policy. It is certainly true
that global terrorism is a serious threat to the national security of many
European states. However, the threat of terrorism cannot be used as a
justification for introducing new terrorism courts with more flexible procedural underpinnings. The use of security detention for suspected terrorists is not a general practice under the Convention regime – it always
depends on the circumstances of the case if such ―pure‖ security based
detentions can be justified in times of national emergency. As a matter
of principle, terrorist activities can amount to an emergency that allow a
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state to derogate from its obligations under Article 15. However, there is
only one Council of Europe State which had made use of this clause so
far since 9/1183, the U.K. The effect of the House of Lord’s ruling of
84
December 16, 2004 in the Belmarsh Prison Case , however, is that de85
Thus, the threrogation from Article 15 requirements is invalidated.
shold for allowing detention in light of an emergency is not to be taken
lightly.
The ECtHR does not universally specify to what extent special procedural rules can deviate from the standards of criminal justice. 86 Any
such specification would be dependent on the circumstances of the case
and on the importance of rights that are at stake. The consistency in the
application of procedural standards is especially important because of the
multitude of counter-terrorist modifications to national criminal justice
systems. Such consistency must preclude abuse and arbitrariness in national detention policies. The role of external accountability pursuant to
the ECHR is crucial in this respect.
The elaboration of national detention strategies remains largely in
the discretion of the respective Contracting State. Meaningful modifications to the existing criminal justice systems, if necessary, would prevent
a Contracting State’s move into a different legal order and would not accord the terrorists the privilege of being a ―special‖ target of the State’s
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repressive machine. Criminal justice allows enough flexibility in dealing
87
with alleged terrorists. Preventive detention for security purposes may
appear meaningful in some situations, but it is fraught with uncertainties
as to the basics of procedural fairness and to the rule of law. The principles at stake in cases of preventive security detention are too valuable
to be left to special security courts sitting in camera and applying dubious standards of procedural fairness.
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